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Abstract
We build on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) and examine the efficacy of credible
assignments in a stag−hunt type coordination game with two Pareto−ranked equilibria, one
payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of our subjects fail to coordinate
to the payoff dominant outcome when no assignment is made. However, the majority of them
always coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome when an assignment is made. This
happens regardless of whether the assignment is “almost common knowledge” or “common
knowledge”.
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A number of prior experimental studies have documented that in stag-hunt type 
coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, subjects often fail to 
coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome. Payoff dominance, therefore, is often not 
a good predictor of the equilibrium selected in these games. Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe 
and Ross (1990) study a number of coordination games with two Nash equilibria - a 
payoff dominant equilibrium and a risk dominant equilibrium. They find that while 
the majority of players select strategies that lead to a Nash equilibrium, it is also the 
case that the most frequent outcome is the risk dominant equilibrium rather than the 
payoff dominant one.  Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) study a minimum effort 
coordination game where they also find this tendency on the part of the subjects to 
converge to the secure outcome rather than the payoff dominant one. This latter result 
is replicated in Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher (2004).   
Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe and Ross (1990) argue that players’ beliefs about 
other players’ strategies are the key to the outcome of this type of coordination games. 
They posit that beliefs can be inferred from the strategy selected by players even 
though such beliefs are inherently unobservable. This suggests that if we can 
strengthen a player’s beliefs that his pair member will choose the strategy 
commensurate with the payoff dominant outcome, then we should observe an increase 
in the proportion of payoff dominant outcomes in the game.  
A number of studies look at interventions that might help players in stag-hunt 
games to coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome. Van Huyck, Gillette and 
Battalio (1992) study “credible assignments” where an assignment is a non-binding 
pre-game announcement made by an external arbiter instructing the players to adopt a 
particular strategy.  
One of the coordination games studied by Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio 
(1992) is shown in Table 1. They find that assignments to the payoff dominant 
outcome of {1, 1} are credible to most players. When players are instructed to choose 
strategy 1, 98% of the pairs managed to coordinate to the {1, 1} equilibrium 
following the assignment. At the same time, they also find that assignments to other 
equilibria – namely {2, 2} and {3, 3} - are not credible to over half of the players. 
When players deviate from the strategy they are asked to choose, it is always to 
strategy 1, i.e. to the strategy commensurate with the payoff dominant outcome. 
Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe and Ross (1992) study the role of one-way and two-
way communication in games with two Pareto-ranked equilibria – one payoff 
dominant and the other risk dominant. One-way communication allows only one 
player to make a non-binding announcement about the strategy he will choose in the 
game while in two-way communication both players are allowed to make non-binding 
announcements. They find that one-way communication raises the proportion of 
players who play the payoff dominant strategy. However, it is not strong enough to 
facilitate consistent coordination to the payoff dominant outcome. Two-way 
communication, on the other hand, solves the coordination problem in their simple 
2X2 coordination game, i.e. the majority of players coordinate to the payoff dominant 
outcome. Two-way communication, however, does not solve the coordination 
problem in the cooperative coordination game which is a 3X3 game that includes a 
dominated strategy for each player. Considerable coordination failures are still 
observed.  
   1In this paper we wish to re-examine the efficacy of an external assignment 
such as the one in Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992). It is possible that the 
structure of the payoff matrix in their game might be a factor behind the efficacy of 
the assignment. In their game there is no obvious conflict between payoff dominance 
and risk dominance. As they also point out in their paper (p. 611) the payoff dominant 
outcome {1, 1} is also the outcome which requires the smallest “minimum sufficient 
degree of credibility”. Therefore, the {1, 1} outcome is the most credible outcome in 
this game, which is followed by {2, 2} and then by {3, 3}. It would be instructive to 
see how well a similar assignment works in a different game where there is a sharp 
distinction between the payoff dominant and risk dominant outcomes.  
There is another issue that we wish to address here. In Van Huyck, Gillette 
and Battalio (1992), the assignments are “common knowledge” in that the message 
given to the subjects are projected on the lab wall and also read aloud by the 
experimenter. Thus each player knows that all other players have received the same 
message and they have also heard this information read out loud. What will happen 
when the assignment is only “almost common knowledge”, i.e. the assignment is only 
handed over to the players on a sheet of paper and not read aloud? In the latter case 
not every player may be convinced that every other player has actually read the 
message on the sheet of paper or even paid attention to it.  
Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher (2004) study an inter-generational version of  
the Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) minimum effort game where subjects in 
generation t can leave free-form advice for their generation t+1 successors. Chaudhuri 
et al. find that this process of leaving advice does facilitate coordination to the payoff 
dominant outcome but only when such advice is both public and common knowledge, 
i.e. advice from all players in generation t is made public to all players in generation 
t+1 and this advice is also read aloud by the experimenter. They find that even small 
deviations from such “common knowledge” – for instance when advice is made 
public to all members of a generation on a sheet of paper or projected on the lab wall 
but not read aloud – leads to seriously sub-optimal outcomes with massive 
coordination failures.  
Rubinstein (1989) studies an electronic mail game where he shows that there 
is a dramatic discontinuity in behavior when subjects move from having “almost 
common knowledge” to “common knowledge” of the payoffs of the game. Here two 
players, player 1 and player 2, are involved in a coordination game. Each can take one 
of two actions, “A” or “B”, and there are two possible states of nature, “a” or “b” 
which occur with probability (1-p) and p respectively with p < 1/2, making state “a” 
more likely.  See Table 2. Initially only player 1 knows the true state of nature. 
Suppose that the two players can only communicate via electronic mail. There is a 
small probability, ε, that due to technical problems the message does not arrive at its 
destination. Rubinstein assumes that when player 1 gets the information that the state 
of nature is “b”, his computer automatically sends a message to player 2 and then 
player 2's computer confirms the message and then player 1's computer re-confirms 
the message and so on. If the message does not arrive, the communication stops. No 
message is sent if the state of nature is “a”. If the machines exchanged messages 
infinitely, then there would be “common knowledge” about the state of nature and 
players would find it easy to coordinate their actions. Rubinstein demonstrates, 
however, that for any finite number of exchanges, the only equilibrium is for both 
players to choose A in each period. Hence, even if a large number of messages are 
exchanged back and forth, a situation where players should have at least “almost 
   2common knowledge” of the true state of nature if not common knowledge, Rubinstein 
shows that the players can not obtain an expected payoff in equilibrium higher than 
what they could achieve without any information exchange.  
Consequently, the second question we investigate is what will happen when 
the assignment is only “almost common knowledge” and not “common knowledge” 
as in Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992). What happens if the assignment is only 
handed over to players on a sheet of paper but is not read aloud as opposed to a 
“common knowledge” assignment where each player receives the assignment on a 
sheet of paper and this information is also read aloud to them? We should point out 
that in our game common knowledge or the lack thereof applies to the assignment 
only and not to the payoffs of the game itself. Thus we do not claim any formal 
similarity between our results and those of Rubinstein (1989).  
We find that in our study only around 38% of the pairs manage to coordinate 
to the payoff dominant outcome in the absence of an assignment. This result is similar 
to that in the simple coordination game in Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe and Ross (1992). 
However, when an assignment is made, whether it is an “almost common knowledge” 
or a “common knowledge” assignment, the majority of the pairs manage to coordinate 
to the payoff dominant outcome.  
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we explain the design of our experiment. 
In Section 3, we report our main findings. We make concluding remarks in Section 4. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures  
The experiments were conducted in a computer laboratory at the University of 
Auckland using the Veconlab on-line software developed by Charles Holt at the 
University of Virginia. (http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.htm). We use the on-
line instructions and do not provide a copy here. The participants are primarily first 
year students in Microeconomics and Macroeconomics at the University of Auckland.  
There are two sessions with 20 subjects (10 pairs) in each session for a total of 
40 subjects. Each session consists of 12 rounds of play of the stage game. In each 
session subjects first play 4 rounds with no assignment. Then an assignment is made 
prior to the beginning of round 5. This assignment is either “almost common 
knowledge” or “common knowledge” for the players. After this the players play for 8 
more rounds consecutively in that particular treatment with no further announcements 
made. In session 1, the 4 rounds with no assignment are followed by 8 rounds of 
“common knowledge” assignment while in session 2 this is followed by 8 rounds of 
“almost common knowledge” assignment. Subjects are randomly assigned into row 
and column participants. The participants are randomly re-matched at the end of every 
round.
1  
The actual game that the subjects played is shown in Table 3.
2  
Row players can choose to play either {Top} or {Bottom}. Similarly, column 
players can choose to play either {Left} or {Right}. There are three Nash equilibria in 
this game. {Top, Left} is the payoff dominant equilibrium while the risk dominant 
equilibrium is {Bottom, Right}. There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where the 
                                                 
1 It is possible for two players to interact more than once. But subjects never get to see the 
identification number of the player they are paired with and there is no scope for reputation building.  
2 The payoff matrix is taken from Rydval and Ortmann (2004).  
   3Row player plays {Top} with probability 4/7 and {Bottom} with probability 3/7 while 
the Column player plays {Left} with probability 4/7 and {Right} with probability 3/7. 
In the first four rounds of each session, subjects play the game shown in Table 
3 without any assignment being made by the experimenter. In the “almost common 
knowledge” treatment, prior to beginning round 5, the experimenter hands out a sheet 
of paper to all the players with the following message: 
 
ROW PARTICIPANT: CHOOSE TOP. 
 
COLUMN PARTICIPANT: CHOOSE LEFT.  
 
IF THE ROW PARTICIPANT CHOOSES TOP THEN THE BEST THE COLUMN 
PARTICIPANT CAN DO IS TO CHOOSE LEFT. IF THE COLUMN 
PARTICIPANT CHOOSES LEFT THEN THE BEST THAT THE ROW 
PARTICIPANT CAN DO IS TO CHOOSE TOP. 
 
NOTICE, from the payoff matrix, that if both the Row and Column participants 
follow the message then they both earn 8 experimental dollars. However, if one of the 
participants follows the message and the other does not, then both participants will 
earn a smaller amount.   
 
The language and presentation of the announcement is virtually identical to the one 
used in Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992). The subjects then play 8 more 
rounds with no further announcements being made. 
For the “common knowledge” treatment, again, after the first 4 rounds and 
immediately prior to the beginning of round 5, the experimenter hands out the same 
message shown above on a piece of paper but in addition the message is also read 
aloud in front of all subjects. Again the subjects play 8 more rounds after this with no 
further announcements being made.  
We should point out that in our study the assignment to a strategy is done only 
once prior to the beginning of round 5 of the 12 rounds of play as opposed to Van 
Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) where the authors make an announcement prior to 
each round of play.  
Since we have 10 pairs in each session we get 10 plays of the game in each 
round. Thus we get 80 plays of the game in the no assignment treatment (10 plays of 
the game for each of the first 4 rounds over two sessions), 80 plays of the game with a 
“common knowledge” assignment (10 plays of the game for each of 8 rounds in 
Session 1) and 80 plays of the game with an “almost common knowledge” assignment 
(10 plays of the game for each of 8 rounds in Session 2). 
The payoffs are denoted in experimental dollars and are converted into cash at 
the rate of NZ $0.10 per experimental dollar. Subjects also get a $5 show-up fee for 
being on time. They are paid privately at the end of the session. Each session lasts 
about 45 minutes and subjects make NZ $13 on average including the $5 show up 
fee.
3
                                                 
3 At the time when the experiments were carried out the exchange rate was approximately NZ $1 = US 
$0.72.  
   43. Results 
 
We begin by looking at the actual strategies adopted by the players in the three 
different treatments. After that we undertake a careful analysis of the actual outcomes 
in the different treatments.  
We will refer to a choice of Top or Left (i.e. a strategy choice commensurate 
with the payoff dominant outcome) as Strategy 1 and Bottom or Right as Strategy 2. 
In the absence of an assignment, 58% of players play Strategy 1 while 42% play 
Strategy 2. There is a dramatic change once we make the assignment with players in 
both the “almost common” and “common” knowledge treatments choosing strategy 1 
in 90% cases or more. See Table 4.  
Next, we look at the proportion of outcomes under each treatment (see Table 5 
and Figure 1). We find that in the absence of an assignment 37.5% of the plays result 
in the payoff dominant outcome while 21.3% plays lead to the risk dominant 
outcome. The highest proportion (41.3%) is of disequilibrium outcomes of either 
{Top, Right} or {Bottom, Left}. These results are similar to that in Cooper, Dejong, 
Forsythe and Ross (1992) when no communication is allowed among players. 
 
When we move to the “almost common knowledge” assignment, where each 
subject gets a sheet of paper with the message, 92.5% of the player pairs manage to 
coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome. Now only 7.5% plays result in the 
disequilibrium outcome and there are no risk dominant outcomes. Under the 
“common knowledge” assignment, the proportion of payoff dominant outcomes is 
82.5%. As a whole, the majority of players in our game can coordinate to the payoff 
dominant outcome when an assignment is made, regardless of whether this 
assignment is almost common knowledge or common knowledge. This suggests that 
assignments in our game help players to form optimistic beliefs that their pair 
members in the game will choose a strategy commensurate with the payoff dominant 
equilibrium.  
 
Using a sample proportions test
4 we find that compared to the no assignment 
treatment, the proportions of payoff dominant outcomes are significantly higher in the 
almost common knowledge treatment (z = 8.93, p = 0.00) as well as the common 
knowledge treatment. (z = 6.52, p = 0.00).  
 
However, contrary to our expectation we find that the proportion of payoff 
dominant outcomes turns out to be higher under the “almost common knowledge” 
assignment (92.5%) than under the “common knowledge” assignment (82.5%). Upon 
closer examination we find that this result is caused by a particular row player - player 
number 9 in Session 1 - who consistently chooses “Bottom” every round even after 
receiving the message to choose “Top”. It is not clear to us whether this is due to a 
misunderstanding of the assignment or some other factor. It is possible that this player 
                                                 
4 If the two relevant sample proportions are p1 and p2 and the two samples have n1 and n2  observations, 
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   5cares less about absolute earnings and more about relative earnings. Suppose player 9 
believes that, after the assignment is made, every column player will be convinced by 
the assignment and will consistently choose “Left” for the rest of the session. Then 
player 9, by choosing “Bottom”, can ensure that he gets $5 while his pair member 
gets $1. This, of course, does not maximize player 9’s own earnings and given that 
players are re-matched at the end of every round player 9’s power to depress the 
earnings of others is limited.  
 
Next, we exclude this player and re-analyse the results. That is for each round 
of Session 1 we exclude the pair which includes player 9. This means that for each 
round of this session we lose one play of the stage game. This reduces the 
observations under no assignment from 80 to 76 (since there are 4 rounds of no 
assignment) and under “common knowledge” assignment from 80 to 72 (since there 
are 8 rounds of “common knowledge” assignment). As one can see from Table 6 and 
Figure 2, once we exclude this particular player the outcomes in the “almost common 
knowledge” treatment and the “common knowledge” treatment are virtually identical. 
We carry out a sample proportions test to see if the proportion of payoff dominant 
outcomes in the “common knowledge” treatment is different from that in the “almost 
common knowledge” treatment after we exclude player 9. We get a z-statistic of 0.19 
with a corresponding p-value of 0.85. Thus the null hypothesis that there is a 
difference in the proportion of payoff dominant outcomes under the two assignments 
can be comfortably rejected at conventional significance levels. This suggests that in a 
simple stag-hunt type coordination game, it is sufficient but not necessary to make 
common knowledge assignments in order to induce optimistic beliefs among players. 
Even a weaker form of assignment can help the majority of players coordinate to the 
Pareto-efficient outcome. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
There are three main conclusions arising from this study. First, without an assignment 
we observe significant coordination failures similar to those found in previous studies 
such as Cooper et al. (1990). Introduction of an assignment along the lines of Van 
Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) facilitates coordination to the payoff dominant 
outcome. Thus a credible assignment made by an external arbiter facilitates 
coordination to the payoff dominant outcome even in a game where there is a clear 
distinction between the payoff dominant and risk dominant outcomes. Second, 
coordination to the payoff dominant outcome is achieved with both “almost common 
knowledge” and “common knowledge” of the assignment and there is no significant 
difference between the two. This result is in contrast to Chaudhuri, Schotter and 
Sopher (2004) who find that only “common knowledge” of advice, which is a form of 
assignment, helps subjects reach the payoff dominant outcome in the minimum effort 
game. Third, in our study the assignment is made only once with the players 
proceeding to play 8 more rounds afterwards compared to Van Huyck, Gillette and 
Battalio (1992) where the assignment is made prior to each round. In spite of the one-
time nature of the assignment, it still managed to generate optimistic enough beliefs 
that enabled players to coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome consistently. Thus 
in this simple 2X2 coordination game at least, a weaker form of assignment works 
well in enabling players to coordinate to the payoff dominant outcome. 
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   7Table 1 
Payoff matrix in Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992)  
 
 Column  Player 
  1 2 3 
1  9,9 0,0 0,0 












Table 2  
Payoff matrix in Rubinstein (1989)  
Game Ga in State “a” (Probability 1-p) 
 Player  2 
 A B 
A  M, M  0, - L 
 
Player  
1  B  - L, 0  0, 0 
 
Game Gb in State “b” (Probability p) 
 Player  2 
 A B 
A  0, 0  0, - L 
 
Player  





Payoff matrix in our study 
 Column  Player 
 Left  Right 












   8Table 4 
Proportion of players choosing Strategy 1 or Strategy 2 under different 
treatments 
  Strategy 1  Strategy 2 
No assignment  58%  42% 
Almost Common Knowledge Assignment  96.3%  3.7% 







Proportion of outcomes in each treatment 
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{Bottom, Left} 
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No Assignment  39.5% 
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Figure 1 
 
Proportion of Outcomes in Each Treatment
{Top, Left}
{Top, Left}
















































Proportion of Outcomes in Each Treatment excluding Player 9 
{Top, Left}
{Top, Left} {Top, Left}
{Bottom, Right}
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